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Making Litigating Citizenship More 
Fair 
 
Ming H. Chen 
 
 In Litigating Citizenship, Cassandra Burke Robertson and Irina 
D. Manta chart the contours of expanding immigration enforcement in 
the Trump administration: from criminal aliens and illegal aliens, to 
legal immigrants, to naturalized citizens.1 In their own words, their 
interest is “How do we determine when a particular individual meets—
or fails to meet—the legal requirements that determine citizenship 
under our laws?”2 More specifically, they want to assess whether the 
government’s determinations are fair. Their focus on challenges to 
citizenship is a much-needed spotlight on the excesses of modern 
immigration policy and their effect on our democracy. 
 Their Article includes great examples of how citizenship 
challenges arise on a daily basis.3 Recent episodes of citizenship 
 
       University of Colorado Law School Associate Professor and Faculty-Director Immigration 
and Citizenship Law Program. Author of Pursuing Citizenship in the Enforcement Era (Stanford 
University Press, forthcoming 2020). 
1.    Cassandra Burke Robertson & Irina D. Manta, Litigating Citizenship, 73 VAND. L. REV. 
757 (2020). 
2.    Id. at 760. 
3.    Id. at 767–81. 
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determination disputes at the border,4 denaturalization task forces,5 
and wrongful deportation6 are richly detailed and placed in historical 
context. Beyond the in-depth description that brings to life the concept 
of citizenship challenges, the Article includes an extended reflection on 
due process and the need for fairness in government advances of 
individual rights.7 The authors emphasize the procedural safeguards 
that need to be placed on the U.S. government to balance out its 
immense power over comparatively weaker individuals because of the 
distinctive nature of citizenship contests.8 Citing Justice Felix 
Frankfurter’s words, “The history of liberty has largely been the history 
of observance of procedural safeguards.”9  
  Due process is a well-chosen vehicle for examining fairness in 
immigration proceedings. The history of immigration law has been a 
struggle to secure “procedural safeguards” for immigrants, often 
directed at recognizing the stakes of noncitizens living inside U.S. 
borders. As those in the world of immigration law know, pushing for 
due process is how immigration lawyers get things done. That is 
because long traditions of sovereignty, plenary power, and deference to 
executive discretion leave little opportunity for litigating the substance 
of immigration policies,10 notwithstanding recent litigation focusing on 
 
4.    The range of passport denials at the border include news stories and litigation from the 
last year. See, e.g., Esqueda v. Pompeo, ACLU MINN. (last visited Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.aclu-
mn.org/en/cases/esqueda-v-pompeo [https://perma.cc/6FXU-MHRL]; Dara Lind, Trump’s 
Stripping of Passports from Some Texas Latinos, Explained, VOX (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/8/30/17800410/trump-passport-birth-certificate-hispanic-denial-
citizens [https://perma.cc/LZ9Z-LMHD]; Kevin Sieff, U.S. Is Denying Passports to Americans Along 
the Border, Throwing Their Citizenship into Question, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-is-denying-passports-to-americans-
along-the-border-throwing-their-citizenship-into-question/2018/08/29/1d630e84-a0da-11e8-a3dd-
2a1991f075d5_story.html [https://perma.cc/D8AS-Q4YF]; Brandon Stahl, Minnesota Man and 
Marine Vet Born in U.S. Files Legal Challenge to Passport Denial, STARTRIBUNE (May 9, 2019), 
http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-man-born-in-u-s-files-legal-challenge-to-passport-
denial/509719882/ [https://perma.cc/68H6-AD79]; Debbie Weingarten, My Children Were Denied 
Passports Because They Were Delivered by a Midwife, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/03/opinion/weingarten-homebirth-border-passports.html 
[https://perma.cc/9K6N-G3NG]. 
5.    See, e.g., Katie Benner, Justice Dept. Establishes Office to Denaturalize Immigrants, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/26/us/politics/denaturalization-
immigrants-justice-department.html [https://perma.cc/P4B8-VYBM]; Seth Freed Wessler, Is 
Denaturalization the Next Front in the Trump Administration’s War on Immigration?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/magazine/naturalized-citizenship-
immigration-trump.html [https://perma.cc/V3VC-MZNA]. 
6.     See, e.g., Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. 
Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606 (2011). 
         7.     Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 781–84. 
8.     Id. at 799–809. 
9.      McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). 
10.  Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 600 (1990). 
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substantive constitutional provisions like the Equal Protection Clause11 
and substantive administrative law standards like arbitrary and 
capricious review.12 
  What Robertson and Manta contribute as well-informed 
observers looking into the world of immigration law are their skills as 
procedural experts. Their deft analysis of burden shifting and reliance 
could only be provided by an experienced litigator or keen proceduralist. 
Take this passage, where they leverage insider knowledge of how 
burdens of proof impact removal proceedings:  
When an individual subject to removal proceedings makes a claim of citizenship, the 
government bears the burden of proof to establish that the individual is a noncitizen. A 
majority of the U.S. courts of appeals agree that the individual can raise a claim of 
citizenship at any time in the proceedings—the claim is not forfeited by failure to raise it 
earlier in the proceedings nor by failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to 
judicial review.  
The government’s burden of persuasion in such proceedings is heightened: it must 
establish noncitizenship by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.”  This is 
unquestionably a higher standard that an individual seeking a declaratory judgment of 
citizenship would have to meet. Within that standard, however, courts have applied a 
complex burden-shifting scheme. Although the government bears the initial burden to 
prove noncitizenship, a mere showing that the individual was born outside the United 
States is sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption of noncitizenship that then shifts 
the burden to the person claiming citizenship. Once the burden has shifted, the individual 
must then either dispute the evidence of birth abroad or show how citizenship was 
obtained—perhaps through derivative status or naturalization.13 
 They embed their tactical analysis in reflections on core values 
such as reliance liberty, stability, finality, and fairness that cut across 
immigration law and bind it to universal legal norms. Or, at least, they 
bind immigration law to the norms that ought to govern government 
actions against individuals. Their willingness to import universal 
norms is a valuable contribution to the jurisprudence of immigration 
law. 
 The lens of due process also touches on a big and too often 
overlooked idea: immigrants are part of the American political 
community and have individual rights that require government 
justification before they can be deprived or infringed. By design, power 
flows from the citizens to the state and not the other way around. The 
 
11.    Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (discussing Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214 (1944)). 
12.    There have been legal challenges to the reasonability of DACA, public charge rules, and 
asylum changes. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, No. 18–587 
(U.S. argued Nov. 12, 2019); Public Charge, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR., 
https://www.ilrc.org/public-charge [https://perma.cc/WPK2-7UU5] (last visited Mar. 12, 2020); 
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Says Trump Can Bar Asylum Seekers While Legal Fight Continues, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/us/politics/supreme-court-
trump-asylum.html [https://perma.cc/36WG-4ZTB]. 
13.    Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 775–76. 
                
2020] VANDERBILT L. REV. EN BANC 136 
authors take a significant analytical step when they link immigrants’ 
rights with constitutional norms for citizens. Immigration advocates 
have sought to make the case that immigrants and citizens exist on a 
continuum for years: the rallying cry of recent social movements has 
been that immigrants’ rights are civil rights. Though the specific 
incidents that give rise to immigrants’ rights social movements are 
multitudinous, citizenship cases are a very convincing way to make this 
point.14 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause provides for 
birthright citizenship and naturalization.15 Once the threshold of 
citizenship is crossed, there ought to be little contention about the 
sanctity of individual rights and liberty. Save the skirmishes for the 
border or other cases where political boundaries are less settled.  
 But in the current policy environment, nobody is safe from 
immigration enforcement—not even U.S. citizens. The forces of 
exclusion and enforcement extend between borders, rooting out anyone 
who is not U.S.-born to U.S.-born parents. For that matter, it roots out 
anyone who is not U.S.-born to a certain kind of parents whom conform 
to mainstream cultural norms.  
 The adherence to selective citizenship and the willingness to 
redraw the bounds of citizenship as part of immigration politics is a new 
and an old idea.16 Some people will never belong, as suggested by the 
government’s efforts to curtail birthright citizenship going back to Dred 
Scott v. Sandford,17 Elks v. Wilkins,18 and U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark.19 
Modern legislative proposals to end birthright citizenship for children 
of undocumented immigrants (derisively called “anchor babies”) and 
executive actions to end birthright citizenship for legal nonimmigrants 
(derisively called “birth tourism”) breathe new life into these old 
debates.20 The nearly unbroken trajectory of exclusion shows that the 
 
14.    The authors cite Professor Rachel Rosenbloom’s argument that “procedural safeguards 
within an adjudicatory system cannot be premised on a line that the system is itself engaged in 
drawing.” Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 
54 B.C. L. REV. 1965, 2021–22 (2013). That is, procedural safeguards cannot be offered only to 
citizens because those safeguards are needed to protect the citizenship determination itself. 
Procedural safeguards must apply at an earlier stage, ensuring that individuals engaged in the 
legal system—whether they are known to be citizens or not—have a full and fair opportunity to 
have their claims heard.  
15.     U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
16.     Jelani Cobb, Donald Trump’s Idea of Selective Citizenship, NEW YORKER (July 29, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/07/29/donald-trumps-idea-of-selective-citizenship 
[https://perma.cc/UGL6-E2BD]. 
17.    60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
18.    112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
19.    169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
20.   A recent example of legislation to end birthright citizenship is H.R. 140 Birthright 
Citizenship Act of 2019, introduced by Rep. Steve King on January 3, 2019, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/140 [https://perma.cc/8AZC-PK3W]. 
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laws and mores will make sure that marginalized minorities struggle 
to gain citizenship. The authors are well aware of the racial history of 
exclusion embedded in the Citizenship Clause.21 Their recognition of 
this history of exclusion functions as an important counterweight to the 
“lofty” goals of naturalized citizenship elsewhere in the citizenship 
scholarship.22  
 Moving to core case studies of citizenship challenges in the 
Article, the authors consider procedural unfairness in each of these 
situations: 
 
• Failures to recognize citizenship—in which they discuss 
challenges to passports presented at the border, despite the 
birth of the individual inside the U.S. or to U.S. citizen parents, 
as in the case of Mark Esqueda23 and Mary Elizabeth Elg,24 
respectively.25 
 
• Denaturalizing citizens—in which they link the infamous 
denaturalization of Emma Goldman during the red scare26 with 
recent government attempts to denaturalize citizens in 
Operation Janus and still-unfolding proceedings.27 
 
 
President Trump has said that he wants to abolish birthright citizenship by executive order. 
Patrick J. Lyons, Trump Wants to Abolish Birthright Citizenship. Can He Do That? N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 22, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/us/birthright-citizenship-14th-amendment-
trump.html [https://perma.cc/N8NP-ZBQA]. The Trump administration’s State Department has 
instituted a policy to block visas for pregnant women to combat “birth tourism.”  Temporary 
Visitors for Business or Pleasure: A Rule by the State Department, 85 Fed. Reg. 4219 (Jan. 24, 
2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/01/24/2020-01218/visas-temporary-
visitors-for-business-or-pleasure [https://perma.cc/BB3X-ND54]. 
21.     See Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 765. 
22.    Id. at 764 (quoting D. Carolina Núñez, Citizenship Gaps, 54 TULSA L. REV. 301, 313 
(2019). 
23.    Stahl, supra note 4. See generally Esqueda v. Pompeo, supra note 4. 
24.    Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939). 
25.    Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 767–69, 771–73. 
26.    Id. at 761–66; Emma Goldman, A Woman Without A Country, FREE VISTAS, reprinted 
in PATRICK WEIL, THE SOVEREIGN CITIZEN: DENATURALIZATION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 187–95 (2013). 
27.   Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 780. These denaturalization operations are 
described in Cassandra Burke Robertson & Irina D. Manta, (Un)Civil Denaturalization, N.Y.U. L. 
REV. (2019); Amanda Frost, Alienating Citizens, 114 NW. L. REV. 241 (2019); Unmaking 
Americans: Insecure Citizenship in the United States, OPEN SOC. JUST. INITIATIVE (2019), 
https://www.justiceinitiative.org/publications/unmaking-americans [https://perma.cc/A5FF-
RV9F]. 
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• Wrongful deportations and other litigation raising various types 
of tangles U.S. citizens have had with immigration 
enforcement.28  
 
 All of these situations add up to a portrait of unstable 
citizenship, and even more examples could be imagined.29 The 
instability is similar to what I found in my interviews with green card 
holders30 and what other scholars have reported from surveys of DACA 
recipients, TPS holders, and other immigrants holding lesser legal 
protections.31 This mounting challenge to immigration and naturalized 
citizenship, the authors argue convincingly, amounts to nothing less 
than a threat to democracy.32 
 What more could the authors do in this Article? They could 
extend the scope of their focus on challenges with litigation to recognize 
the large swath of unreviewable actions of executive discretion. The 
insulation of immigration-related actions from courts is furthered by 
the heavy use of guidance within the agency, Congress’s jurisdiction-
stripping statutes, and the encroachment both of the White House on 
immigration agencies and of immigration agencies on one another.  
 They could also extend the scope of their search for remedies 
beyond the Constitution. Much of immigration law is administrative 
law33 and focuses on the Administrative Procedure Act rather than on 
constitutional norms. The litigation over inclusion of a citizenship 
question in the 2020 U.S. Census is a recent example. Only partially 
 
28.    Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 807–09; Lyttle v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 2d 
1256 (M.D. Ga. 2012); Turner v. United States, No. 4:13-CV-932, 2013 WL 5877358, at *1 (S.D. 
Tex. Oct. 31, 2013); see Stevens, supra note 6. 
29.    For example, the rising burdens on the path to citizenship are another way of making 
citizenship determinations unfair. Citizenship Delayed: Civil Rights and Voting Rights 
Implications of the Backlog in Citizenship and Naturalization Applications, Report of the Colorado 
Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, reprinted in 91 COLO. L. REV. FORUM 
(2019); Ming H. Chen, Citizenship Denied: Implications of the Naturalization Backlog for 
Noncitizens in Military, 97 DENV. U.L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
30.    MING H. CHEN, PURSUING CITIZENSHIP IN THE ENFORCEMENT ERA (forthcoming 2020). 
31.   Roberto G. Gonzales, Kristina Brant, & Benjamin Rother, DACAmented in the Age of 
Deportation: Navigating Spaces of Belonging and Vulnerability in Social and Personal Lives, 43 
ETHNIC & RACIAL STUDIES 60 (2019). 
32.   See Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 810 (“It is only by protecting citizenship 
interests that constitutional democracy, which rests on the idea of political equality, can 
function.”). 
33.    See Jill E. Family, Online Symposium: Is Immigration Law Administrative Law? 
Introduction, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 8, 2016) https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/online-
symposium-is-immigration-law-administrative-law-introduction-by-jill-e-family/ 
[https://perma.cc/2VZA-G4U5] (noting “the intersections of immigration law and administrative 
law”) (including contributions from Chris Walker, David Rubenstein, Shoba Wadhia, Bijal Shah, 
and Michael Kagan). 
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settled in the Supreme Court,34 the case leaves open questions about 
how the government could properly add a question inquiring about 
citizenship status and whether the Executive Order that sets 
expectations for interagency cooperation and data sharing about 
citizenship will prove to be unfair.35 
 Part III of Litigating Citizenship, on the uncertain constitutional 
basis for increased procedural safeguards, attempts to build a strong 
case for heightened procedure based on the “factual complexity” of 
citizenship.36 The authors note some of these troublesome facts: most 
citizens do not carry their birth certificates or passports; some people 
do not even own these documents; and mental illnesses or poverty may 
compound the inability to furnish documentary evidence of 
citizenship.37 And the authors note that “ ‘some individuals may be 
citizens without knowing it, due to the rules governing acquired and 
derivative citizenship’—rules that have changed just within the last few 
years.”38  The authors seek a larger role for equity to acknowledge the 
factual complexities of citizenship.  
 The notion of equitable defenses would seem to be common sense 
in other policy arenas. Equitable principles are called upon because 
many immigration cases are intensely fact-based inquiries and 
discretion ought to be available to right wrongs. But equity is not a 
winning argument in immigration law and equitable discretion is 
fading: tools like JRAD (Judicial Recommendation Against 
Deportation), deferred action, and administrative closure are being 
taken away from immigration judges. 
 Ultimately, immigrants are not treated like U.S. citizens under 
existing law or equitable principles. They are largely unrepresented by 
counsel, often do not know the charges against them, and have limited 
opportunity to appeal adverse findings given the politicized nature of 
the immigration courts. This does not change even when they face 
criminal-like consequences such as being jailed in detention—a point 
that has been made by Cesar Garcia Hernandez, Ingrid Eagley, and 
 
34.    See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2567, 2576 (2019) (holding, among 
other things, that the Constitution permits the Secretary of Commerce to inquire about citizenship 
in a census questionnaire but invalidating the inclusion of a citizenship question in the 2020 
census questionnaire because the Secretary’s stated reasons for including such a question were 
mere pretext).  
35.     See Collecting Information About Citizenship Status in Connection with the Decennial 
Census, 84 Fed. Reg. 33821 (July 11, 2019) (the Executive Order). 
36.    Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 784–85 (quoting Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking 
Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1824–25 (2013)). 
37.      Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 785.  
        38.    Id. (quoting Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1825 
(2013)). 
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many other crimmigration scholars.39 This false hope for more robust 
and equitable treatment of immigrants may not be a blind spot of the 
authors so much as a blind spot in the law itself. Their faith that due 
process comparable to what is offered in a criminal context could 
improve the process available to immigrants is refreshing. However, it 
is somewhat unrealistic given the losing battle of immigration 
advocates and scholars to equate immigration-detention with criminal 
practices in the current political environment.40 
           Still, immigrants and naturalized citizens have constitutional 
rights, especially due process. The question is: how much due process? 
That question goes to the heart of heightened procedural protections 
owed in citizenship cases. After all, if it is only the individual’s interests 
that matter, then the due process protections of ordinary civil litigation 
should surely be good enough. Courts adjudicate matters such as child 
custody, workers’ compensation benefits, and other civil matters that 
strike at the core of individuals’ lives and concerns every day. What is 
different about citizenship? The authors argue that the citizenship 
difference stems from the political order enshrined in the U.S. 
Constitution.41 I find this to be the most compelling part of their 
argument. A court’s concern is not whether a particular person is 
exercising any particular rights of free speech, political association, or 
exercise of religion; its concern is the potential chilling effect on other 
people if litigation procedure leaves citizenship protections vulnerable. 
            Recalling Afroyim v. Rusk, the case forbidding involuntary 
expatriation other than for fraud or illegal procurement of citizenship, 
the Court discussed the close ties between democracy and citizenship.42 
Justice Black writing for the majority said, “The very nature of our free 
government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of law 
under which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive 
 
         39.    See Cesar Garcia Hernandez, Desconstructing Crimmigration, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
197, 229 (2018) (“Roughly two-thirds of migrants in removal proceedings go without an attorney; 
for detained migrants, the overwhelming majority do not have access to a lawyer.”); see also 
Jennifer Chacon, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 613, 651 (2012) 
(“In criminal courts along the southern border, illegal entry pleas are counseled only nominally, 
with six to ten defendants pleading at a time with the assistance of one public defender.”); Juliet 
Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 
367, 393 (2006) (“Noncitizens in immigration proceedings . . . generally do not have the right to 
appointed counsel at government expense . . . .”). 
 40.     See, e.g., Ingrid Eagley, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L. J. 2282, 2286 (2013) (arguing 
that “[i]n th[e] . . . half century after Gideon [v. Wainwright], the once-separate domains of 
criminal law and immigration law have merged”). 
 41.     Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 793–99. 
 42.   387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967); see also Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 779–80; 794–97 
(discussing the impact of Afroyim). 
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another group of citizens of their citizenship.”43 For this reason, the 
authors prescribe that “[p]rotecting citizenship . . . means rethinking 
litigation procedures” to ensure that they offer protection 
commensurate with the interests at stake in those suits and that reflect 
the seriousness of liberty and reliance interests involved in citizenship 
challenges.44 This seems right, and it argues against an anomaly in 
constitutional law: citizenship is subordinated, rather than elevated, to 
merit increased attention from the courts45—and ultimately, the 





 43.    Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268. 
 44.    Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 810. 
         45.    Ming H. Chen, Alienated: A Reworking of the Racialization Thesis After September 11, 
18 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 411, 434 (2010) (“[U]nder constitutional law . . . lower levels of 
scrutiny are applied to judicial review of alien (noncitizen), as opposed to citizen, discrimination 
claims.”). 
